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Two studies investigated associations between habits and identity, in particular what 
people consider as their “true self.” Habit-identity associations were assessed by within-
participant correlations between self-reported habit and associated true self ratings of 80 
behaviors. The behaviors were instantiations of 10 basic values. In Study 1, significant 
correlations were observed between individual differences in the strength of habit-identity 
associations, measures of cognitive self-integration (prioritizing self-relevant information), 
self-esteem, and an orientation toward an ideal self. Study 2 further tested the assumption 
that habits are associated with identity if these relate to important goals or values. An 
experimental manipulation of value affirmation demonstrated that, compared to a control 
condition, habit-identity associations were stronger if participants explicitly generated the 
habit and true self ratings while indicating which values the behaviors would serve. Taken 
together, the results suggest that habits may serve to define who we are, in particular 
when these are considered in the context of self-related goals or central values. When 
habits relate to feelings of identity this comes with stronger cognitive self-integration, 
higher self-esteem, and a striving toward an ideal self. Linking habits to identity may 
sustain newly formed behaviors and may thus lead to more effective behavior 
change interventions.
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INTRODUCTION
What determines our identity? A potential source of identity, which has received little attention 
in the literature on the self and the self-concept, is the array of our habits. A large portion 
of everyday behavior is habitual, that is, being performed frequently, often automatically, and 
in stable contexts (e.g., Verplanken and Aarts, 1999; Wood et al., 2002; Gardner, 2015; Verplanken, 
2018). Habits vary in a number of ways. One is complexity; some habits involve simple acts, 
such as nail biting or checking the time, while others are part of more complex behaviors or 
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routines, such as donating to charity or exercising. Habits also 
vary in terms of involvement of other people. For instance, 
taking the car to work is a solitary activity, whereas calling 
your parents maintains a relationship. And habits vary in the 
extent to which they are important to us. We  may not even 
be aware of the many unimportant habits, such as where you sit 
at the table or the way you  tie your shoes. Other habits are 
more important, such as those which express an important 
value. An unanswered question is whether or when habits 
contribute to what we  consider as our identity, and if this is 
the case, how these sources of identity are embedded in other 
self-related constructs and processes, such as beliefs about 
ourselves, self-esteem, and self-regulation.
Personal or self-identities can be  considered as mental 
representation individuals hold about who they are, which 
include autobiographical memories, self-attributions, beliefs, 
motivations, recurrent thoughts, emotions, and self-perceptions. 
These narratives are constantly constructed and revised (e.g., 
Vignoles, 2011). Habits may become part of self-identities 
through various psychological processes. One such process may 
be  the end result of enacted motivations, such as suggested 
in socio-cognitive models (e.g., Fishbein and Ajzen, 1975; Deci 
and Ryan, 1991; Rise et al., 2010). A strong motivation, anchored 
in self-identity, may instigate repeated action, which may then 
become a habit. Such habits may function as vehicles of self-
control in accomplishing a goal: habits relieve an individual 
from having to deliberate and decide on actions and may thus 
promote the accomplishment of a goal (e.g., Galla and Duckworth, 
2015). Another path to a habit-identity relation is through 
self-perception (e.g., Bem, 1972). Through the perception of 
our own frequently performed behaviors, we  may infer that 
these are important to us and may thus be  part of who we  are 
(e.g., Neal et  al., 2012; Wood and Rünger, 2016).
Empirical Evidence for a Habit-Identity 
Relation
What is the evidence for a habit-identity relationship? Some 
habits directly signify a particular identity. For instance, while 
the culture around smoking is rapidly changing, in some 
population segments this habit still stands for masculinity 
or being “cool” (e.g., Ng et  al., 2007). Self-identity has been 
studied as a potential addition to the theory of planned 
behavior. This theory poses an intention to act as the primary 
determinant of behavior, which in turn is determined by an 
attitude, normative pressure, and perceived control of the 
behavior (e.g., Ajzen, 1991). In a meta-analysis on the role 
of self-identity in the theory of planned behavior, Rise et  al. 
(2010) established that self-identity correlated 0.33 with past 
behavior, which has often been considered as a proxy for 
habit. A number of primary studies provided evidence for 
a habit-identity association. Charng et  al. (1988) reported a 
0.22 correlation between blood donation habit and a measure 
of identity as blood donor. Gardner et  al. (2012) found a 
strong correlation between measures of binge drinking habit 
and binge drinking identity among university students 
(r = 0.69). Gardner and Lally (2013) found a strong correlation 
between habit and intrinsic motivation for physical activity 
(r  =  0.64). Gatersleben et  al. (2014, Study 2) found that 
measures of environmental and frugal identities mediated 
between environmental values and pro-environmental behaviors 
(βs  =  0.35 and 0.28, respectively). Lindgren et  al. (2015) 
found a significant correlation between an implicit measure 
of drinking identity and drinking habit (r = 0.36). Verplanken 
and Roy (2016) found that an index of pro-environmental 
habits correlated significantly with biospheric values (r = 0.31), 
personal norms (r = 0.45), and personal involvement (r = 0.30), 
i.e., constructs that are closely related to self-identity. McCarthy 
et  al. (2017) reported a strong correlation between a measure 
of health-conscious identity and an assessment of healthy 
eating habit (r = 0.69). Albini et al. (2018) found a significant 
correlation between personal importance and habit of 
consuming vegetables (r = 0.49). As the relationships mentioned 
above are correlational, the causal flow in the habit-identity 
relation is unknown and may well be bi-directional: a particular 
identity may instigate behavior and thus maintain a habit, 
while the self-perception of a habit may feed into self-identity 
(cf., Wood and Rünger, 2016).
Two perspectives outside the social psychological domain 
may be  taken to support a link between habit and identity. 
The first comes from the area of moral development of the 
self as a core of personal identity. Developing a self-concept 
and self-identity comes with the development of a moral 
identity (e.g., Blasi, 1994). From an early age, we  learn to 
“do the right thing” in a variety of situations. By repeating 
such moral actions, these may turn into moral habits and 
feed into a moral identity. Such habits may become what can 
be  designated as “character,” “second nature dispositions,” or 
indeed, a moral identity (e.g., Aquino and Reed, 2002; Hulsey 
and Hampson, 2014; Ward and King, 2018). Second, an 
interesting view on the relationship of habit and identity from 
a philosophical perspective was put forward by Wagner and 
Northoff (2014). These authors discussed the difference between 
“personhood” and “personal identity.” Personhood refers to 
features that define a person at one specific point in time. 
However, as such features are fluid and impermanent, and 
in order to persist as the same person, that is, to have a 
personal identity, features need to remain stable. Wagner and 
Northoff (2014) thus considered habit as an explanatory 
construct, which links these different temporal dimensions to 
form a personal identity.
The empirical basis of a relationship between a habit and 
a self-identity is not unequivocal. For instance, Murtagh et  al. 
(2012) reported nonsignificant correlations between a measure 
of identity and measures of past travel mode behaviors (rs 
varying between 0.02 and 0.07). Also, while in the Albini 
et  al. (2018) study cited above personal importance and habit 
of consuming vegetables correlated significantly, no such 
correlation was present for consuming fruit (r  =  0.06). There 
was neither evidence of a habit-identity relation in a 
comprehensive study into the nature of students’ everyday 
habits conducted by Wood et  al. (2002), in which participants 
were asked to write hourly reports on their ongoing behaviors 
and experiences. If anything, in this study habits were associated 
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with negative self-evaluations and the relative unimportance 
of these behaviors for attaining personal goals.
Taken together, the studies and perspectives discussed above 
lead to two conclusions. The first is that there exists significant, 
and sometimes substantial, associations between measures of 
habit and measures of self-identity, and there are some 
arguments beyond social psychology for such a relationship. 
Second, such correlations are not being found across the 
board; there is a large variation between studies in the size 
of habit-identity correlations. This suggests that certain habits, 
but not all, relate to self-identity. We  contend that prime 
candidates for such a role are habits that are related to 
important goals or values. Goals and values may be integrated 
in one’s self-concept and are thus likely to be  repeatedly 
enacted (e.g., Deci and Ryan, 1991; Sheldon and Elliot, 1999; 
Aarts and Dijksterhuis, 2000; Verplanken and Holland, 2002; 
Bardi and Schwartz, 2003; Hitlin, 2003; Gatersleben et  al., 
2014; Burkley et  al., 2015). In addition, we  anticipate that 
people differ in the strength of habit-identity associations. 
First, different people have different habits and may thus 
associate different habits with their self-identity, which may 
lead to variation between studies. Second, people may differ 
in the extent to which they identify habits as being relevant 
for one’s identity in the first place.
The Integrated Self
An emerging theme in the literature on the self is the realization 
that some parts of the self are more essential than others, 
which has been referred to as real self (e.g., Rogers, 1961), 
authentic self (e.g., Koole and Kuhl, 2003; Johnson et  al., 
2004), or true self (Newman et  al., 2014; Strohminger et  al., 
2017). At the heart of this concept lies the notion of an 
integrated self, that is, a high degree of connectedness within 
and between cognitive, affective, motivational, and behavioral 
systems. Kuhl et  al. (2015) presented a neurobiological model, 
which explains the various functional characteristics of the 
integrated self, such as emotional and somatosensory 
connectedness, attention to self-relevant information, and self-
positivity. The integrated self is holistic and incorporates a 
vast amount of autobiographical memory. It functions by means 
of high-level parallel-distributed processing, operating largely 
at implicit levels, and is thus able to integrate a large amount 
of self-related processes – cognitive, emotional, motivational, 
and volitional – simultaneously (Kuhl et al., 2015). We contend 
that self-perception of behaviors per se is not what connects 
them to the self but that behaviors become part of the integrated 
self if two conditions are fulfilled. One is that the behavior 
has become habitual, that is, being repeatedly and automatically 
executed and has thus become ingrained in the person’s 
autobiographical memory. The second is that a behavior is 
related to an important goal or value. This is not the case 
for all habits and for all individuals.
Sui and Humphreys (2015) summarized a body of work 
that sheds light on properties of an integrated self in more 
detail at the neuro-cognitive level. As an indicator of the 
degree to which a person possesses an integrated self, these 
researchers used perceptual matching tasks, which assess 
differences in reaction time and accuracy between matching 
self-related versus other-related stimuli (Sui et  al., 2012). 
Larger differences indicate stronger self-prioritization effects 
(i.e., a stronger “self-bias”). Sui and colleagues demonstrated 
that self-referencing can have wide-ranging integrative effects 
with respect to perception, attention, memory, and decision 
making (e.g., Sui et  al., 2012), which is thus interpreted as 
cognitive self-integration. This evidence suggests that self-
referencing is not simply a narrative reflecting ongoing self-
related processes. Rather, self-referencing actively modulates 
cognitive processes and acts as a “glue,” which binds different 
forms of information, for instance, between stimuli in 
perception and memory, or integrates different stages of 
information processing, such as in decision making. Sui et al. 
(2012) argued that self-referencing leads to robust self-
prioritization effects in perception and cognition. Sui and 
Gu (2017) further put forward a neural framework of an 
integrated self where they argued that cognitive and affective 
aspects of the self-interact to influence behavior through the 
three neural networks – the ventral network including the 
ventral medial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC), the cognitive control, 
and the salience networks. Researchers have reported that 
inducing emotional valence can alter self-prioritization in 
face recognition. For example, when participants are asked 
to evaluate negative personality traits, there is a reduced 
advantage for processing self vs. others’ faces (Ma and Han, 
2010). Consistent with this, the self-prioritization effect in 
the perceptual matching task was disrupted in individuals 
with low mood (Sui et  al., 2016), due to the breakdown of 
the integrated self (in this case, the intrinsic association 
between self and positive emotion) in depressed individuals. 
In short, the strength of self-prioritization (“self-bias”) observed 
in these perceptual matching tasks can be  considered as a 
proxy for cognitive self-integration.
At the experiential level, a number of authors describe the 
“true self,” which arguably is a subjective experience of an 
integrated self (e.g., Newman et  al., 2014; Strohminger and 
Nichols, 2014; De Freitas et  al., 2018). The true self is what 
a person considers as one’s authentic core and is experienced 
as inherently moral and good. Although the true self is in 
essence a belief a person holds about oneself and may thus 
be false or distorted, it has consequences for a person’s cognitive 
and social functioning. For example, it has been reported 
that unfavorable self-related events are more likely to 
be  forgotten (Hu et  al., 2015). People also tend to attribute 
positive outcomes to themselves relative to other people while 
linking negative outcomes to others, thus demonstrating biased 
causal attributions in social evaluation (Greenwald, 1980), or 
to influence the environment (e.g., Newman et  al., 2014). 
Finally, moral values that make up someone’s true self may 
serve as benchmarks to judge others’ moral value status (e.g., 
Newman et  al., 2014). Thus, the true self has the potential 
to evoke feelings of self-worth and a sense of meaning in 
life (e.g., Schlegel et  al., 2009) and to protect the self from 
negative perspectives (Sedikides and Green, 2009). Particular 
habits, then, may be seen as instantiations of the accomplishment 
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of goals or values associated with the true self and may thus 
become incorporated in one’s self-identity.
The Present Studies
The present studies aimed at investigating the relationships 
between the degree to which individuals associate habits with 
their true self and how this relates to cognitive, affective, and 
motivational aspects of the self. Variation in habit-identity 
associations was assessed by presenting participants with 80 
behaviors, and asking two ratings for each of those behaviors, 
i.e., self-reported habit and how much the activity reflects their 
true self. For each participant, a correlation was calculated 
between these two ratings across the 80 behaviors, which thus 
served as a measure of habit-identity associations. In Study 1, 
this association measure was correlated with the measures of 
cognitive self-integration obtained by the perceptual matching 
paradigm as developed by Sui et  al. (2012). In addition, the 
study contained assessments of self-esteem as an affective 
component of the self and chronic self-regulatory focus style 
(i.e., “promotion” and “prevention”; Higgins, 1998) as a 
motivational aspect of the self. A promotion style is an orientation 
toward hopes, aspirations, and your ideal self. A prevention 
style is an orientation toward safety and responsibilities and 
fulfills what you  think ought to be  done. Positive correlations 
were expected between habit-identity associations, cognitive 
self-integration, self-esteem, and a promotion-style self-regulatory 
focus. Study 2 focused in more detail on the habit-identity 
association measure. This study aimed at demonstrating that 
habit-identity associations are stronger if these are being generated 





The study was conducted in a laboratory at the authors’ 
university. A power analysis was conducted prior to this study. 
In a previous study among 67 participants, admittedly older 
than in the present study, a mid-range correlation of 0.36 
(p  <  0.003) was found between cognitive self-integration in 
the perceptual matching task used in the present study and 
a self-report measure of personal distance (Sui and Humphreys, 
2017). Together with setting an α of 0.05, two-sided testing, 
accepting a power of 0.80, and aiming at detecting medium 
effect size correlations (r ≈ 0.30), a sample size of approximately 
85 was required. A total of 90 participants were recruited 
from the university’s student population. There were 29 males 
and 61 females. Their mean age was 21  years (SD  =  2.67). 
All participants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision. 
Informed consent was obtained from all participants according 
to procedures approved by the authors’ departmental ethics 
committee (IRB).
Participants worked individually and visually separated. They 
first carried out the perceptual matching task, which assessed 
cognitive self-integration. This was followed by a questionnaire, 
which contained the habit and identity ratings and assessments 
of self-esteem and self-regulatory focus. A session took 
30–40 min. Participants were paid £5.00 for their contribution.
Measures
Cognitive Self-Integration
Cognitive self-integration was measured by assessing the 
strength of self-prioritization (“self-bias”) in a perceptual 
matching task (Sui et  al., 2012). Participants were first asked 
to name one of their best friends. They then selected a gender-
matched stranger from a common name list not corresponding 
to anyone they knew. The named friend and stranger were 
then used in the perceptual matching task, where they were 
instructed to associate three geometric shapes (triangle, circle, 
square) with labels indicating the self (“You”), the named 
best friend (“Friend”), and the named stranger (“Stranger”), 
respectively. The assignment of the particular shapes to the 
three labels was counterbalanced across individuals. The self-
prioritization scores were calculated using the performance 
scores of “You” and “Stranger.” The reason “Friend” was 
included in the task was to make it sufficiently challenging 
so as to avoid ceiling effects.
After the association instruction, participants conducted 
the shape/label matching task. Participants were asked to 
judge whether or not simultaneously presented shape/label 
pairs (e.g., a circle/“You”) matched according to the associations 
they had been instructed to make. Each trial started with a 
central fixation cross for 500  ms, followed by a shape/label 
pair at the center of the screen for 100 ms. A shape (triangle, 
circle, or square) with 3.5  ×  3.5° of visual angle appeared 
above a white central fixation cross with 0.8  ×  0.8° of visual 
angle. One of three labels (“You,” “Friend,” or “Stranger”) 
covering 1.76/2.52°  ×  1.76° of visual angle was displayed 
below the fixation cross. All stimuli in white were displayed 
on a gray background. E-prime software version 2.0 was 
used to present the stimuli and to record responses. The 
experiment was run on a PC with a 22-in monitor 
(1,920  ×  1,080 pixels) at 60  Hz.
Half of the shape/label pairs conformed to the association 
instruction and should thus be responded to as “match” trials; 
on the remaining trials, the shapes and labels were re-paired 
to form “mismatch” trials. For mismatch trials, a shape was 
paired with one of the other labels (e.g., a circle/“Stranger,” 
in our example). The next frame was a 1,000  ms blank field. 
Participants were encouraged to make a “match” or “mismatch” 
response as quickly and accurately as possible within this 
1,000 ms interval by pressing one of two keys on the keyboard 
with the index or middle finger of the right hand. The order 
of response keys was counterbalanced across participants. A 
feedback message (“correct,” “incorrect,” or “too slow”) was 
then given in the center of the screen for 500 ms. Participants 
were informed of their overall accuracy at the end of each 
block. There were three blocks of 60 trials following 12 
practice trials. Thus, there were 30 match and 30 mismatch 
trials in each block.
Self-bias scores were calculated for reaction times (RT) 
and accuracy, respectively, for correct responses on match 
Verplanken and Sui Habit and Identity
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 5 July 2019 | Volume 10 | Article 1504
shape-label trials. Only correct responses longer than 200  ms 
were included. All participants had accuracy scores >0.55 
(i.e., 5% or more above chance level). Self-bias on RT was 
inferred from the difference in RT for the self against the 
stranger condition, divided by the sum of the two conditions 
and multiplied by 100 {i.e., 100  ×  [(stranger − self)/(self + 
stranger)]}. Self-bias on accuracy was indexed by the difference 
in performance for the self against the stranger condition 
divided by the sum of the two conditions [i.e., (self − stranger)/
(self + stranger)]. Larger scores of both measures indicated 
a stronger self-bias and thus were taken as stronger cognitive 
self-integration.
Habit-Identity Associations
Participants were presented with 80 behaviors, which were 
chosen to cover 10 value-related motivation areas (cf., Schwartz, 
1992; Bardi and Schwartz, 2003): hedonism (e.g., “Enjoy a 
movie”), stimulation (e.g., “Do something exciting”), self-direction 
(e.g., “Find something out by yourself ”), universalism (e.g., 
“Buy ecological products”), benevolence (e.g., “Donate to 
charity”), conformity (e.g., “Wear what’s in fashion”), tradition 
(e.g., “Attend family occasions”), security (e.g., “Make sure your 
door is locked”), power (e.g., “Make your voice be  heard”), 
and achievement (e.g., “Study during the weekend”). Participants 
were asked to provide two ratings for each of the behaviors. 
The first rating was the self-reported frequency of performing 
the behavior (“How frequently do you do this activity”), which 
was considered as a proxy for habit strength. Responses were 
given on a 5-point scale ranging from “never” (1) to “always” 
(5). The second rating concerned the extent to which the 
behavior reflected participants’ true self. The instruction was 
to indicate “how much this activity is something that reflects 
who you  really are as a person (your “true self ”).” Responses 
were given on a 5-point scale ranging from “not at all” (1) 
to “very much” (5). For each individual participant, a correlation 
was calculated between the frequency and true self ratings 
across the 80 behaviors. These within-participant correlations 
were considered as a measure of individual differences in habit-
identity associations.
Self-Esteem
Self-esteem was assessed by the 10-item Self-Esteem Scale 
(Rosenberg, 1965). Sample items are “I feel I  have a number 
of good qualities” and “I wish I  could have more respect for 
myself ” (reverse-coded). Responses were given on 5-point scales 
ranging from “disagree” (1) to “agree” (5). Scores were coded 
such that higher numbers indicate higher self-esteem. Cronbach’s 
α was 0.85.
Self-Regulatory Focus
Individual differences in self-regulatory focus were assessed 
by the 18-item Promotion/Prevention Scale (Lockwood et  al., 
2002). The scale contains two subscales measuring a promotion 
and a prevention self-regulatory orientation, respectively. 
Examples of promotion orientation items are “I frequently 
imagine how I  will achieve my hopes and aspirations” and 
“My major goal right now is to achieve my ambitions.” Examples 
of prevention orientation items are “I’m anxious that I  will 
fall short of my responsibilities and obligations” and “My major 
goal right now is to avoid becoming a failure.” Responses were 
given on 7-point scales ranging from “not at all true of me” 
(1) to “very true of me” (7). Scores were coded such that 
higher numbers indicate a strong promotion or prevention 
focus. Cronbach’s αs were 0.87 and 0.73 for the promotion 
and prevention orientation subscales, respectively. The correlation 
between the two subscales was 0.42, p  <  0.001. In order to 
investigate the unique variances of each subscale, uncorrelated 
factor scores for each subscale from a Varimax rotated factor 
analysis were used in the further analyses.
Results and Discussion
The within-participant habit-identity correlations ranged from 
−0.19 to 0.89, suggesting substantial individual differences in 
habit-identity associations. The median correlation was 0.46. 
In the subsequent analyses, the habit-identity correlations were 
Fisher-Z transformed, although the results were nearly identical 
when untransformed correlations were used.
In Table 1, means, standard deviations, and correlations 
between the study variables are presented. In Figure 1, the 
corresponding scatterplots of eight key correlations are shown. 
The results suggest that the degree to which individuals associated 
habits with self-identity correlated statistically significantly with 
both self-bias measures as well as with self-esteem and a 
promotion self-regulatory orientation. In addition, the self-bias 
measures correlated statistically significantly with self-esteem 
and a promotion orientation.
TABLE 1 | Means, standard deviations, and correlations (Study 1).
Variable M SD 2 3 4 5 6
1. Habit-identity associations1 0.46 0.36 0.34*** 0.34*** 0.45*** 0.68*** 0.06
2. Self-bias on RT 6.23 5.34 0.51*** 0.22* 0.40*** 0.09
3. Self-bias on accuracy 0.11 0.12 0.21* 0.41*** 0.05
4. Self-esteem 3.60 0.71 0.52*** −0.34***
5. Promotion orientation2 0.00 1.00 0.00
6. Prevention orientation2 0.00 1.00
Note: N = 90. * = p < 0.05; *** = p < 0.001. 
1Within-participant Fisher-Z transformed correlations.
2Factor scores from a Varimax rotated solution. The means and standard deviations of the promotion and prevention raw scores were 5.13 (1.01) and 4.39 (0.88), respectively.
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Feelings of identity derived from habits were found 
associated with cognitive, affective, and motivational facets 
of the self. The pattern of correlations suggests that individuals 
for whom habits are strongly related to feelings of identity 
show stronger cognitive self-integration, higher self-esteem, 
and a stronger striving toward an ideal self. Note that the 
obtained correlations were between three very different types 





FIGURE 1 | (A–H) Scatterplots of key correlations in Study 1.
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latency/accuracy data, and self-assessments, respectively, which 
speaks against inflated correlations due to consistency and 
social desirability biases.
STUDY 2
The assumption in Study 1 was that habits are implied in 
feelings of identity if these relate to important goals or values. 
Study 2 aimed to test that assumption. We  contend that habit-
identity associations are stronger if participants affirm the values 
that are perceived to be  related to the respective habits. The 
habit-identity association task, which was used in Study 1, 
was thus presented under two conditions1. In a value affirmation 
condition, participants were asked for each of the 80 behaviors 
to indicate why they would do the activity, in addition to the 
habit and true self ratings. They could choose between 10 
values, which represented the motivational continuum of 
Schwartz’s (1992) value circumplex. Participants in the control 
condition indicated for each activity at which time of the day 
they would likely engage in the activity and could choose 
between 10 specified times. The expectation was that the within-
participant correlations between the habit and true self ratings 
would be  stronger in the value affirmation versus control 
condition. The rationale was that value affirmation would 
enhance the salience of goals participants adhered to, which 
would thus lead to higher importance ratings.
Method
Participants and Design
The study was conducted online via Prolific Academic, which 
is a UK-based platform for online studies. A power analysis 
was conducted prior to this study. As there are no previous 
studies that could serve as a benchmark, we  aimed at being 
able to detect a small effect size in a two-sided t test between 
two independent samples (Cohen’s d  ≈  0.25), setting an α of 
0.05, and accepting a power of 0.80. The sample size needed 
for this setup was approximately 500. A total of 500 participants 
were recruited, 482 of which completed the study. All participants 
were students. There were 307 males and 173 females, while 
two participants did not indicate a gender. Their mean age 
was 22  years (SD  =  3.07). Informed consent was obtained 
from all participants according to procedures approved by the 
departmental ethics committee (IRB). Participants were randomly 
allocated to a value affirmation versus control condition. The 
task took 15–20  min to complete. Participants were paid £2.25 
for their contribution.
Materials
The habit-identity association task contained the same 80 behaviors 
that were used in Study 1. As an explanation of habit ratings, 
participants were told: “How much of a habit is this activity for 
you? A habit is something you  do frequently and automatically.” 
The ratings were then introduced as “When you  have the 
1 None of the other assessments in Study 1 were included in this study.
opportunity, how frequently and automatically do you  do this?2” 
Responses were given on a 5-point scale ranging from “never” 
(1) to “always” (5). As an explanation of true self ratings, 
participants were told: “How much does the activity reflect who 
you  really are as a person? That is, to what extent does the 
activity represent what you  would consider as your ‘true self.’” 
The identity ratings were then introduced as: “How much does 
this activity reflect your true self?” Responses were given on a 
5-point scale ranging from “not at all” (1) to “very much” (5). 
In between each habit and identity rating, participants in the 
value affirmation condition were asked to choose from a pull-
down menu why they would do the activity (“If you  would do 
this, why?”). They were presented with 10 value areas (Schwartz, 
1992), which were briefly explained: “Influence (social status and 
prestige, control over people and resources)”; “Achievement 
(personal success, competence, meeting high standards)”; “Pleasure 
(enjoyment, sensual gratification, indulgence)”; “Excitement 
(adventure, novelty, seeking challenges, exploring)”; “Independence 
(seeking freedom, independence, uniqueness, creativity)”; “Welfare 
(understanding, tolerance, welfare of people and nature)”; “Helpful 
(helping people you  meet or are in frequent contact with)”; 
“Tradition (respect, commitment, acceptance of customs from 
culture or religion)”; “Conformity (abiding by the rules, meeting 
others’ expectations, respecting norms)”; “Security (safety, harmony, 
stability for yourself, others, and the community at large).3” The 
value labels and their descriptions were presented on an instruction 
page, while the pull-down menu contained the 10 value labels. 
In the control condition, participants were also presented with 
a pull-down menu but were asked to indicate when they would 
do the activity (“If you  would do this, at what time would this 
typically occur?”). They could select one of the following 10 
times: 7  AM, 9  AM, 11  AM, 1  PM, 3  PM, 5  PM, 7  PM, 9  PM, 
11  PM, and 1  AM.
The validity of the value affirmation manipulation was tested 
in an online study among 93 participants. There were 38 males 
and 55 females, while two participants did not indicate a 
gender. Their mean age was 27  years (SD  =  8.28). Informed 
consent was obtained from all participants according to 
procedures approved by the authors’ departmental ethics 
committee (IRB). Participants were presented with a random 
selection of 25 from the 80 behaviors and were randomly 
assigned to the value affirmation or control condition described 
above. For each behavior, they were asked how important this 
activity would be  for them on a 6-point scale ranging from 
“not at all” (1) to “very much” (6). The 25 ratings were averaged. 
Participants in the value affirmation condition indeed gave 
higher importance ratings than participants in the control 
condition, M-value affirmation  =  4.02, control  =  3.73, 
t(91)  =  2.25, p  <  0.03, Cohen’s d  =  0.47. This supported the 
validity of the value affirmation manipulation.
2 We used “frequently and automatically” in Study 2 instead of “frequently” in 
Study 1, because, on reflection, the former is more aligned with contemporary 
conceptions of habit (e.g., Verplanken and Orbell, 2003; Gardner, 2015).
3 Some of the labels for the value areas were slightly adapted from the original 
labels Schwartz (1992) presented, as some of the latter were found too abstract 
for the purpose of this study (e.g., we  used “helpful” instead of “benevolence”, 
and “influence” instead of “power”).
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The within-participant habit-identity correlations in this sample 
ranged from −0.21 to 0.99. The median correlation was 0.69. 
The median correlation was 0.71  in the value affirmation 
condition and 0.65  in the control condition. A t test was 
conducted after a Fisher-Z transformation of the correlations. 
The difference between the two conditions was statistically 
significant, t(480)  =  2.34, p  <  0.02, Cohen’s d  =  0.21. The 
results were nearly identical when untransformed scores were 
used, t(480)  =  2.58, p  <  0.01, Cohen’s d  =  0.23. This result 
provides proof of concept and suggests that habit-identity 
associations are stronger if habits are linked to value-
based motivations.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
As we  argued in the introduction, habits are not necessarily 
associated with identity. Individuals differ in which habits they 
develop, and thus in which habits, if any, make up part of 
their self-identity. Incidentally, we  do not wish to argue that 
non-habitual behaviors cannot be part of someone’s self-identity. 
Our assumption was that some habits may be  more prone 
to relate to feelings of identity than others, namely those 
habits that are instantiations of chronic goals or values. In 
the present studies, habits were selected that were inferred 
from basic value domains (Schwartz, 1992). As values are 
inherently motivational forces, those habits are more likely to 
be  associated with value-related goals and have a higher 
likelihood to be  central to the self and feelings of self-identity 
(e.g., Verplanken and Holland, 2002). The variation in the 
habit-identity association measure used in both studies 
demonstrated that there are individual differences in the degree 
to which people associate habits with self-identity. In Study 1, 
this variation correlated with cognitive self-integration (self-
prioritization), self-esteem, and a promotion-style self-regulatory 
focus. Study 2 demonstrated that habit-identity associations 
are stronger when these are explicitly considered as instantiations 
of values, which corroborate the assumption that value-related 
habits are implied in feelings of self-identity.
The correlations found in Study 1 are consistent with 
integrated self frameworks as suggested by Kuhl et  al. (2015) 
and Sui and Gu (2017), which stress the interactions between 
cognitive, affective, and motivational aspects of the self for 
control of behavior. The correlations with habit-identity 
associations suggest that perceiving oneself to do things that 
fulfill important goals may be  part of such a network and 
may thus add to feelings of self-worth and represent strivings 
toward an “ideal self.” The latter may also be  a source of 
positive emotional experiences, as positive emotions and higher 
self-esteem are consequences of successful promotion-oriented 
self-regulation (e.g., Higgins, 1998). Consistent with this, breaking 
down intrinsic associations between self and positivity leads 
to reduced performance in self-recognition (Ma and Han, 2010), 
and negative mood induces a decreased self-prioritization effect 
in perception (Sui et  al., 2016). Kuhl et  al. (2015) considered 
self-positivity and inner security as one of the functional 
characteristics of the integrated self. The positive relations found 
in Study 1 may thus point to what Rogers (1961) described 
as characterizing “a fully functioning person,” that is, someone 
who aims at fulfilling their full potential. While the individual 
components that were included in this study are interesting 
in their own right, the apparent relationships between these 
different pieces of data suggest such a more holistic integrative 
structure. Self-perception of habits and associated feelings of 
identity may thus play a role in this system, at least to the 
extent to which an integrated self has been developed. It should 
be  noted though that a strong integrated self is not necessarily 
positive or wholesome but may also characterize individuals 
who are highly delusional or be  associated with narcissism 
and self-aggrandizing. But in those individuals too, self-perception 
of habits may function to support such beliefs.
An important question is what exactly the underlying 
mechanisms are of an integrated self. In other words, what 
are the dynamics that govern the relationships between 
behavioral, cognitive, affective, and motivational facets of an 
integrated self? The correlational data of Study 1, while 
demonstrating relations between these entities, leave unanswered 
questions of causality. For instance, do stronger habit-identity 
associations contribute to stronger cognitive self-integration 
and positive self-feelings, or do individuals with a strong 
integrated self and high self-esteem become more attentive to 
what they are doing to fulfill their ideal self? A promising 
approach to model these relationships is provided by control-
process models, which describe how individuals self-regulate 
in terms of behavior, cognition, affect, and motivation (e.g., 
Carver and Scheier, 1998; Vohs and Baumeister, 2017). While 
elaboration on these models is beyond the scope of this article, 
they describe processes that unfold when individuals experience 
discrepancies between a current state and a goal. Moral values 
that make up part of one’s true self may constitute such goals. 
If and when the self is activated, habits may fulfill different 
roles in a control-process model, for instance, as a way to 
lower the perceived discrepancy between a current state and 
a goal and thus generate positive affect. Habits may also 
function as a standard against which goal fulfillment is evaluated, 
which may lead to positive or negative feelings, depending 
on the outcome of such an operation. Another possible role 
of habits is a mechanism for the mind to prioritize the action 
from a range of options, which would lead to goal fulfillment 
(e.g., Verplanken et  al., 1994).
In both studies, we  correlated participants’ habit ratings with 
the degree to which they perceived these behaviors to be  part 
of their true self. While the true self is experienced as highly 
personal and is fundamental to who a person thinks they are 
(e.g., De Freitas et  al., 2018), the content of the moral beliefs, 
which underlie the true self, are strongly anchored in the culture 
the person belongs to (e.g., De Freitas et  al., 2017). This makes 
the true self an inherently social construct. A specific habit 
(e.g., helping an elderly person) may thus constitute a course 
of action by which a culturally determined moral value 
(benevolence) is expressed. Habits that are strongly associated 
with moral values may thus function as benchmarks to evaluate 
not only oneself but also to make inferences, and indeed, judgments, 
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about  other  people’s personality, mental state, or behavior (e.g., 
Newman et  al., 2014, 2015; De Freitas et  al., 2018).
A limitation of the present studies is that, for the obvious 
reason of avoiding an overload for participants, the habit and 
identity assessments for the 80 behaviors had to be  confined 
to one-item measures, while for psychometric reasons, this is 
not ideal. A related, and arguably more fundamental, limitation 
is that the one-item measures of behavioral frequency leave 
room for the argument that we  measured frequent, repetitive, 
or familiar behaviors, which may or may not be  habitual 
according to the contemporary definitions of habit. This has 
been salvaged somewhat in Study 2 by assessing how “frequent 
and automatic” the behaviors were executed (but see Gardner 
and Tang, 2014). While we  acknowledge this limitation, it has 
been demonstrated in numerous studies that used the Self-
Report Habit Index (Verplanken and Orbell, 2003), which 
contains items assessing the experience of repetition as well 
as automaticity, that these two components are strongly correlated.
As a corollary, the present study contributes to a discussion 
with respect to the Self-Report Habit Index (SRHI; Verplanken 
and Orbell, 2003). One of the 12 items of this scale refers to 
self-identity (“Behavior X is something that is typically me”). 
It has been debated whether this item should be  part of a 
self-assessment of habit (e.g., Gardner et al., 2012; Rebar et al., 
2018). Apart from the fact that this item consistently shows 
high item-total correlations with the scale, the present findings 
support the validity of the item as part of the SRHI.
Insight into the relationship between habit and identity may 
have important implications for behavior change interventions, 
in particular the longevity of a change if an intervention is 
successful. Two conditions may have to be  fulfilled for behavior 
change to be  maintained over time. The first is to turn new 
behavior into a habit, that is, behavior that is executed frequently 
and automatically (e.g., Rothman et al., 2009; Walker et al., 2015; 
Gardner and Lally, 2018). But second, long-term behavior 
maintenance may be  enhanced if a habit becomes part of an 
individual’s self-identity. For instance, West (2006) posits that 
self-identity can be  a major driver of behavior change and, 
importantly, the maintenance of newly acquired behavior (e.g., 
Tombor et  al., 2015). The present studies may thus point to an 
exciting new direction in designing more effective behavior change 
interventions, namely not only changing behavior per se but 
also turning new behavior into habits that are embedded in a 
self-identity context, and thus capitalize on an integrated 
self framework.
Conclusion
Some habits serve a self-identifying purpose, in particular when 
these are considered in the context of self-related goals or 
central values. The self may function as a subjective center of 
gravity, involving cognitive, affective, motivational, and behavioral 
facets (e.g., Sui, 2016). The strength of this “gravitational force” 
differs between individuals. For some, the self seems a relatively 
loosely assembled structure, whereas for others, it has a much 
stronger coherence. The present studies suggest that for the 
latter type of individuals habits may play a role in this structure 
and thus make up part of one’s self-identity.
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